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HERMENEUTICAL PHENOMENOLOGY AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF
SCIENCE

PATRICK A. HEELAN

PART I: Continental and Analytic Philosophy of Science Compared
The two most characteristic interests of continental philosophy1 are (1) its
preoccupation with the problem of the “constitution” of knowledge, and (2) the
effect of the historical and cultural world context of science on the “social
constitution” of scientific knowledge. Such constitution is “hermeneutical,”
when it essentially involves language, natural and artifactual symbols, and
historical communities of interpreters.
Continental philosophy from the start sees science as an institution in a
cultural, historical, and hermeneutical setting. The domain of its discourse is
values, subjectivity, Life Worlds, history, and society, as these affect the
constitution of scientific knowledge. Its notion of truth is that which pertains
to history, political power, and culture. Its concern with science is to interpret
its historical conditions within human society--usually in Western culture.2
Science, from this perspective, is a human, social--and fallible--enterprise. 3 A
concern of continental philosophy of science will include social failure as a
possible indictment of scientific practice.
In contrast, the most characteristic interest of analytic philosophy is its
concern with objectivity and truth, and its preference for the methods of formal
logic.
Analytic philosophy from the start sees science as mankind’s most
successful truth enterprise, the fulfilment of a classical Aristotelian --and
Platonic--desire for perfect knowledge, theoria.4 Analytic philosophy--before
its widespread decline into relativism--had confidence in the power of abstract
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reason and of experimental methods to discover the objective truth that is
beyond history, culture, values, subjectivity, and power.5
The logic and methodologies of the physical sciences are generally not a
matter of dispute for continental philosophy. With respect to these questions,
continental philosophers generally defer to experts who--it is assumed--are
analytic philosophers of science.6 This surface agreement about the “logic of
science” focusses the area of dispute on the principal domain of difference, that
of metaphysics--of the human knower, of the known world, and of the knowing
act. In particular, the actual dispute focusses on whether science is capable of
delivering a metaphysics of nature or whether science is historically and
socially constituted for some other goal than metaphysics-- more precisely,
than a classical metaphysics.
Analytic philosophy generally defends the fundamental position that science
is a knowledge of a privileged kind, not deriving from and not responsible to
the projects and values of the Western cultural world or--to use Sellars’s term-the Manifest Images of our culture7 ; rather, it constitutes a socially and
historically independent account of reality, more reliable than any given so far.
This Scientific Image of the world is truly then a classical metaphysics of
nature.
Those claims come in conflict with the philosophical analysis of science as a
social institution. Either society constitutes all of its institutions and has
responsibility of them, or there is some privileged institution which (it is
alleged) is not constituted by society and over which (it is alleged) society
consequently has no responsibility or control. The latter conclusion is deeply
troubling to the modern conscience remembering its recent political coming of
age in which the Divine Right of patriarchal Princes and matriarchal Church
were fought so stubbornly for the sake of human freedom--the freedom of the
people to determine their own political lives and destiny. Science too must
have a social constitution and, of course, a social conscience.
But how is science socially constituted? What kind of knowledge does it
achieve? Continental philosophy actually finds the goal of science not in a
metaphysics of nature but in society’s pursuit of “technical” human interest.8
As Apel says,
The modern natural scientist must be guided by a technical interest in the
sense of this apriori dependency of the problems upon instrumental
verification. In this supra-individual, quasi-objective connection, his cognitive
interest differs from that of the natural philosophy of the Greeks or the
Renaissance and, in turn, that of Goethe or the romantics. And in this
methodologically relevant interest, the whole of the exact natural sciences
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differ, above all, from the divergent practical interest and world engagement
that lies at the basis of the so-called ‘human sciences’. 9
This paper is directed towards taking issue with this statement. Its claim that
natural science is deficient relative to natural philosophy stems from the fact
that within the context of Western culture and history, scientific knowledge has
value and significance predominantly--though certainly not exclusively-because of the power it confers. This prevalent Western mode of appropriation
of science leaves open, however, other avenues of social appropriation--even
the strictly philosophical, continental style.
Continental philosophy’s rejection of science as a natural philosophy is
stated succinctly by Maurice Merleau-Ponty in the Preface to his Phenomenogy
of Perception:
Edmund Husserl’s directive “to return to the things
10
themselves” was, he says, “from the start a rejection of science.”11 In what
sense was this a rejection of science? It is principally a rejection of the
presumption widespread in our culture and also among scientists that science
alone is objective and capable of representing reality as it is unaffected by
religious or racial myths, political expediency, historical forces, economic selfinterest and other forms of bias and prejudice. Science is uniquely on the path
of truth and privileged on that account.
Continental philosophy’s strenuous rejection of these scientistic claims is
motivated by its fundamental metaphysical position: reality is the Life World,
or just “world”. This is the context of perceived nature and of social realities
constituted by moral, social, political, and religious intentions; and it is the
pervasive background or pre-understanding present in all human dealings with
things and people. If scientific accounts are truly objective, then it follows that
continental philosophy must regard them as not belonging by right to the
world, but only by utility and convenience.
This, I want to point out, is a philosophical conclusion. To hold it does not
mean (as some have argued) that the disciples of continental style philosophy
are committed to quacks and alchemists rather than to modern medicine; like
everyone else, they too prefer the medicine that works best. The question at
issue is not a medical one (which heals best?) but a philosophical one (how do
the entities of science--imperceptible to the unaided senses--relate to reality?).
The lattter question, however, cannot be addressed until the more fundamental
one has been answered: is reality to be understood classically and objectively
or rather as socially constituted?
Continental philosophy usually claims that the entities of scientific theory
that give to science its explanatory power have no reality because they are
imperceptible to the unaided senses; it claims, they are just mathematical
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surrogates for real objects, useful models or metaphors to manipulate the
environment. Continental philosophy’s attack on scientism is then an attack
on the metaphysical and moral claims of rational objective knowledge such as
science claims to be. Its position is: if reality is the world, then the world is
presupposed by science, and science inevitably returns --not to theory-- but to
the world for its concrete reference. Merleau-Ponty expressed rhetorically this
sentiment in a much-quoted passage: scientific objects, he says, are an
“abstract and derivative sign-language, like map making [géographie] relative
to the countryside in which we already know what a forest, a prairie, a river
is.”12 One may want to dispute the suggestion that science is like a map, and
that forests, prairies, and rivers are scientific entities, but the judgment he
expresses about science is typical of the writing of Martin Heidegger (in his
later period), Hans-Georg Gadamer, Karl-Otto Apel, Jurgen Habermas, and the
legions of Herbert Marcuse’s and Friedrich Nietzsche’s followers.13
Included in this group of science critics is by all accounts the later Husserl
who, in The Crisis of European Science and Transcendental Phenomenology,14
led the phenomenological attack on the entrenched objectivism of current
scientistic belief and practice. A closer reading of this late work, however,
shows that the critique had also a parallel and more positive aim--to look at
scientific research as a human way of being-in-the-world, and from this
viewpoint to make a philosophical re-evaluation of natural science. 15 The later
Husserl should be counted as the leader of this secondary movement.
Phenomenology and Natural Science: This secondary movement by
contrast springing from Husserl’s Crisis gives to science a world building
character. During his years at Göttingen (1901-1916), Husserl was a friend
and colleague of the brilliant circle of mathematician-physicists who were to
transform physics-- and all science-- in this century. Among them were Felix
Klein, Richard Courant, Hermann Minkowski, Emmy Nöther, and Hermann
Weyl, but their preeminent leader was David Hilbert.16 Hilbert, with the motto
“physics is too difficult for physicists,” advocated that the leadership of
physics pass to mathematicians: for him, the definitive understanding of
physical nature was to be provided by a universal mathematics of axiomatic
theories.17 Theory making-- axiomatic in thrust-- became central to the method
of the new physics. Such a view--let us call it the “Göttingen view”-- was
shared by Husserl for whom the theory of theories is, as he says, axiomatic
theory of of models or manifolds (Mannigfaltigkeiten).
Husserl, however, made a distinction between theory-making (as the method
of physics) and metaphysics (as the traditional goal of science). While he
agreed with the theoretical orientation of the Göttingen School of physics, he
disagreed with the underlying--Cartesian or “Galilean”--metaphysics that was
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assumed by Hilbert and his colleagues. Such science, he charged, made the
mistake of attempting to replace the world with a set of mathematical models.
That the metaphysics of science enriched the perceptual world with genuine- often new-- scientific phenomena, seemed evident to him.18 Such scientific
phenomena, for example, as the Euclidean character of the physical world,19
are normed by theory (Euclidean geometry), and “realized” with the aid of
scientific instruments (rulers, etc.). These technologies of construction and
measurement prepare (or “corral”) for scientific observation the phenomena (in
this case) of physical geometry. Such phenomena are not ideal entities but
perceptual phenomena that (in a sense to be discussed below) “fulfill”
Euclidian theory.20
A new philosophy of science, Husserl intimated in the Crisis, can begin to
address the experience of the “things themselves” of science; these are the
genuine worldly phenomena of science, those which “fulfill” theory. Such
phenomena enter the world as socially-constituted items, laden, like all the
furniture of the world, with values and history, and wearing the accoutrements
of social power or impotence. Focussing attention on those phenomena lays
the groundwork for a new scientific realism, continental style. 21 First among
these new realists is the later Husserl. Among them also one could make a
case for the Heidegger of Being and Time 22 and for the Merleau-Ponty of The
Visible and the Invisible.23 Some contemporary writers in this genre are listed
among the references. 24
Within phenomenology, then, there are two superficially opposing views
about science. The first attacks the view of science as objective theory for
being a peculiar historical idealogy prevalent in the classical Western tradition
of philosophy and culture. The second attempts to correct that mistaken
ideology by showing that scientific inquiry can and should be understood as
constituted by the basic situation of the human being-in-the-world. At a deeper
level, these views complement one another.
They agree fundamentally about the nature of the human subject as a social
and historical being embodied-- as Merleau-Ponty said-- in detachable and
undetachable sensory organs,25 about reality as the world, and about
knowledge-- even of “theoretical states”-- as fulfilled (or--because the sense of
this term is not yet clear-- “fulfilled”)--in and through perception. In these
three respects, continental philosophy differs profoundly from contemporary
mainstream analytic philosophy of science.
PART II: Hermeneutical Phenomenology
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Hermeneutical phenomenology shares with phenomenology a set of
characteristic concerns.
Firstly, the essence of being human is defined as a practical understanding
of a historical world -- Life World -- an understanding that is worked out in
and through language and other signs; human existence--that is, the experience
of being a human subject--is that of being-in-the-world.26 Secondly, I take
perception to be that form of knowing, by a subject’s practical bodily insertion
in historical world situations, in which reality horizons disclose themselves to
subjects as referents for language. Thirdly, there is a hermeneutical
phenomenology concerned with language and its extensions which provide
both for mystery and for historical development in the uncovering of horizons
of the world. Fourthly, perception has a certain primacy for establishing world,
i.e., a primacy over ordinary language.27 By this I mean that ordinary language
need not be accepted without criticism as the authority about world; it could-and should--be corrected and enriched by attention to the phenomenological
constitution of the perceptual horizons it (ordinarily) designates.
Ordinary language assumes that the criteria of theoretical scientific language
have a universal and overriding privilege. In my book, Space-Perception and
the Philosophy of Science, I showed that visual space often has a geometry
different from scientific geometry because it often serves a different cultural
function from science.
Husserl proposed a method for analyzing the essence or eidos of a
perceptual object which he called, the “method of the variation of profiles.”28
This method presupposes that a perceptual essence or eidos can be taken to be
the symmetry or invariant of an organization of perceptual profiles--a profile
being some way an object can appear to a situated perceiver. Husserl was
familiar with Felix Klein’s Erlanger Programme in which a geometrical object
was defined as a figural symmetry or invariant under the spatial tranformation
group which is both the transformation group of the coordinate reference
frames (in which the object can be represented) and of its representations
(within a coordinate frame). Applying Klein’s model to the perceptual object,
a perceptual object comes to be defined as the symmetry or invariant of one
and the same transformation group which both permutes possible perceivers
among themselves and possible object profiles among themselves.
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Figure 1: The perceptual object O is the symmetry or invariant relative to
the transforamtion group among profiles and perceivers.
Note that the perceptual object (see figure 1) lies “in between” perceivers
and profiles; it is a symmetry they both share. By this I mean that for every
object transformation that leaves the perceiver untransformed, there is a
correlative subject transformation that leaves the object untransformed.
“Objective” and “subjective” transformations match one another, just as when
one moves one’s hand along a wall, one can either speak of the wall
objectively, saying that parts of the wall succeed one another to the feel (the
objective transformation) or one can speak of the hand subjectively, saying that
it brings these parts of the wall in succession to the feel (the subjective
transformation). The former objective version of the transformation (called
“active” by physicists), changes the object; the latter subjective version of the
transformation (called “passive” by physicists) changes the perceiver (as the
object’s frame of reference) in the reciprocal way. 29
One and the same basic transformation group then defines the object and the
subject. The subject so defined is represented by a cluster of active powers
capable of recognizing, exploring, enjoying, or using the perceptual object
whenever it is present and at hand. These powers may involve the use of
instruments and readable technologies. 30
Husserl’s name for the objective transformation group is the noema; his
name for the subjective transformation group is the noesis; each is a part of
(what he called) the noetic-noematic structure. Noesis and noema share the
same abstract group theoretic structure of being and action; they do not
“mirror” one another passively, like picture and copy; their relationship is more
like the dynamic one illustrated above by the finger touching the wall, or which
Aristotle described when he said that the knower becomes the known by living
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the form of the known--the form of the known, in this case, would be the
abstract transformation group.
It is clear from this account that a perceptual object is neither a sensory
datum nor a formal construction out of sensory data. It is a symmetry within
an established (but revisable) perceptual praxis and, consequently, already a
semantic object tied in to a network of established semantical relations.
How does a scientific phenomenon come to “fulfill” its theoretical account
in an act of observation? The classical tradition of physics from Galileo to
Hilbert and from Newton to the Göttingen School assumed that the link
between theory and observation was measurement. Measurement was
supposed to be perfectible, indeed infinitely perfectible converging in the limit
on the values which an objective and true theory would then accurately reflect.
Even Husserl took this to be the case.31 However, as Duhem, Hesse, and
others have shown,32 such an account of the link between measured
phenomena and theory cannot be correct, for theory can never be uniquely
determined by data.33
There is, however, a hermeneutical link34 between theory and data and that
this link is to be understood partly on the model of language and partly on the
model of that kind of interpretation which is exemplified in artistic
performance. 35 This will be taken up below.
A word about constitution or object formation: the constitution of a
perceptual object O is studied from a standpoint “inside” the constituting act by
the one constituting and experiencing the phenomenon--this study is a
phenomenological (“eidetic” or “experimental”) study. This role is indicated
by Sx in figure 2. Husserl’s phenomenological method aims to define the eidos
of such an object O; this definition is abstractive, objectivizing, and
thematizing account.
Eidetic definitions were criticized by Heidegger because they seemed to
deny the ambiguity and flexibility of what is uncovered by understanding.
Such accounts -- he called them, “theoretical”36 -- have to be distinguished
from scientifically theoretical accounts. Scientific theory works specifically
only within the environment of a mathematical-experimental praxis. What this
means will be discussed below.
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Figure 2. The two modes of inquiry into perception, the phenomenological
role Sx and the scientific theoretical-explanatory role St.
Turning to figure 2: Sx is the phenomenological (eidetic or experimental)
inquirer; St is the theoretical inquirer. The constituting action of S x can be
studied as a special kind of human performance from a standpoint “outside” of
Sx--indicated by St; this would focus, for example, on the structural and
semiotic conditions pertinent to the performance of the act of perception. S x
experiences the phenomenon, while St (as we shall see) “explains” the
phenomenon. The characteristic feature of this explanation is that it produces a
mathematical theory of those aspects of the object accessible to the instruments
of our inquiry--technological instruments in experimental science, sensory in
unaided perception. Such a theory has the characteristics of a scientific theory,
and its explanatory role is a scientific one. We can compare such a theory to a
“musical score,” that is interpreted by Sx’s performance in the medium of the
instruments used--but more of this below.
What the theory refers to is indicated in figure 2 by the parenthesis
“(semiotic system)”, this is some underlying “score,” “text,” or “code” that
directs the performance -- Sx’s performance -- of the perceptual act. Such a
semiotic system is envisaged not as part of an epistemological analysis (by S x)
of the performance, but as part of its ontological structure (as judged by St ).
Such performance is hermeneutical in a new and existential way, and one not
too far from that which Heidegger placed at the root of all knowledge.
The semiotic system implicit in the performance directs the eidetic functions
of Sx’s activity in an appropriate way--actually (we surmise) according to the
way a skilled performance like a musical interpretation is guided by its “score”
without, however, being entirely defined by its “score.” The score of a piece of
music is not unique but depends on the social-historical-cultural context
(instruments, audience, conditions of recital, etc.) for the realization of the
piece of music, for a piece of music is a historical entity, different from its
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score and the context of its performance. It would not then be surprising to
find--as we do--that perception’s “score” is no more accessible to a
phenomenological analysis by S x than a musical score is to the well-practiced
player or singer. The (musical) score or (perceptual) “score” is not part of
what is first known and then acted upon, but is rather one of the ontological
conditions of possibility of the perceptual act.
Such an account is a “theory of the perceptual object,” and has the character
of a scientific theoretical-explanatory analysis. Its effect is not reduce the
perceptual object to something merely there, but rather it addresses the
perceptual object indirectly (through S t) by describing a set of formal semiotic
conditions for a perceptual performance terminating in such an object as
perceived by Sx. How such a theory is implemented in the world in a particular
medium at a particular place and time gives an existential hermeneutic account
of perception.
The term “hermeneutics” is taken here in a new and extended sense
suggested by Heidegger’s transformation of phenomenological inquiry in
Being and Time. Consider his example of the hammer.37 The hammer reveals
itself as hammer while it is being used for hammering, but when being so used
the character of being a hammer -- its eidos -- hides itself from the user within
the transparency of the action executed. Just as the score hides itself in the
performance, so the eidos of the hammer hides itself in the execution of
hammering. The eidos nevertheless is there, as a kind of theory that “explains”
the hammer in the hammering. For S x, there is an abstractive account of the
hammer’s eidos -- for Heideggger, a “theory,” an eidos-theory. For St, theory
means something different; it is any model or map of the structure internal to
the instrument that makes hammering possible, e.g., the tool designer’s
blueprint; this enables the “musical score” of hammering to be performed.
Returning to perception: one surmises that the perceptual “score” for
hammering includes neurophysiological, somatic, and environmental elements,
as well as computational and other semiotic elements. Since a perceiver Sx has
very limited access to the way these help “shape” the phenomenon, the
standpoint of the researcher St is not that of the perceiver. Sx and St belong to
different cognitive communities and they are engaged in totally different
causal, hermeneutical, theoretical, and existential relationships to their
respective subject matters. Neither assumes a universal transcendental
viewpoint.
In every hermeneutical activity, there is a certain reciprocity, for example,
between text and meaning, and between score and performance. Such
reciprocity is called “the hermeneutical circle.” 38 Consider S x: on the one
hand, the “score” is (existentially) prior to what is perceived, it does not permit
10
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arbitrary objects to be constituted, it exercises a certain control over the
possibilities of what can be presented to S x and recognized within any given
perceptual medium for any given desired purpose. On the other hand, it is also
(existentially) posterior to what is constituted, for the medium must be “tuned”
to the possibilities of the “score,” for only on that condition will the medium
and “score” succeed in presenting to S x an object with the anticipated
perceptual content. The necessity of such “tuning” makes perception a
performance and a work of artistry.
Making perceptual sense of the world is an individual and social art that
involves the ability to perform transformative motions in a medium so that a
common, shareable, and repeatable experience of presence or absence, of
successful involvement or frustration can be realized. These intention-laden
motions and environmental clues or responses are a part of language in the
constitutive sense and (as I shall hold) can be studied from the viewpoint of St
in a scientific theoretical-explanatory way. Although such abilities and
resources may be sufficient for animal language, they are not, however,
sufficient for human language.39
Spoken words and sentences -- paroles -- belonging to the home language of
a human community enrich the common experience by linking present agents
and speakers immersed in their current worldly involvements with exemplary
epochs, spaces, personalities, and transactions adumbrated in the oral narrative
resources of a culture. They bring ideal (or seemingly transcendental)
normativity to the here and now, and make possible a self-perpetuating
community characterized by repetitive short-term projects pursued against a
background of permanent norms “given (as it were primordially)” together
with the world. The world is now a set of projects “given” to humans within a
traditional culture and to be fulfilled by repetition or reenactment (or -- to use
Piaget’s terms -- accomodation and assimilation). Such narratives permit the
individual speaker to appropriate the norms of the group that share orally-- as
parole-- the same home language.
Written language – language -- brings history into being by evoking the
normative differences that existed between past communities and our own. It
can also bring to our attention the existence of other knowledge communities
than ours with different and alien norms. Thus, from written language,
hermeneutics arises as the appropriate method to study questions of the kind:
with respect to world, have past-- or alien-- communities maintained different
reality norms from ours, and if so, with what reason? In constraints on human
agency (on what is morally possible, just, and worth pursuing), have people
pursued different norms, and if so, with what right? In the understanding of
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society (whether it has a direction, what this is or should be, and who should
control it), can there be different legitimate views?
Challenged as we are by synchronic and diachronic pluralisms in perception,
language, science, culture, and history, I argued in my Space-Perception and
the Philosophy of Science, that such structures fit into the formal model of a
lattice or quantum logic (not, as often taken, of sentences, but) of contextdependent descriptive languages.40 This led me to call for recognition of an
epistemological principle normative for human knowing: disparate horizons
and disparate languages do and should seek upper bounds in an extended
quantum lattice.41 This is one of the regulative principles suggested by a
hermeneutical phenomenology of the scientific tradition.
PART III: Elements of a hermeneutical and phenomenological philosophy
of natural science
A philosopher of science in the phenomenological or hermeneutical tradition
would then be guided by a new thrust different from a philosopher in the
analytic tradition, both in the choice of significant problems and in the manner
in which these are treated. Such a philosopher would do research into
constitutional problems, human embodied subjectivity, and world--Life World-as reality--problems that so not enter into the purview of analytic philosophy
of science.
1. Experimental phenomena: In contrast with the dominant classical interest
in scientific theory making, the new thrust would center on experimental
phenomena and how these come to be constituted as perceptual objects.
Central to such constitution is the dual and complementary roles of
experimenter (Sx) and theoretician (St): the theoretician tries to model
mathematically the readable technologies used by the experimenter to develop
an institutionalized praxis for the preparation and presentation of phenomena.
The two processes dialogue with each other until (provisionally at least) the
last word is spoken by the experimenter when a stable phenomenon of known
symmetry is capable of being produced.
Such scientific phenomena are “dressed” for the world by standardized
scientific instruments used as readable technologies; these contribute to the
historical and social constitution of scientific phenomena as beings in the
world.42 In this regard, what Merleau-Ponty says (in “Eye and Mind”) is
relevant: “our organs are no longer instruments, on the contrary, our
instruments are detachable organs.”43
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2. Scientific theory: One often hears today that all observation whatsoever is
“theory-laden.” What is meant by theory-ladeness in this context is that
whatever is observed (inside or outside of science) involves things which are
not directly observed but are implied by the semantic network of the language.
Such semantic connections are not of themselves scientific (i.e., explanatorytheoretical) connections, and do not constitute a theory, for they are to be found
in natural language which is not a theory about the world but a description of
it. A theory is rather about what underlies--”explains”--the objects of a
descriptive semantic network. 44
Are scientific phenomena theory-laden? What “theory-laden” meant is that
the same names are used of observations as of elements of scientific theory.
However, scientific phenomena can be recognized within the context of a
standardized praxis without the observer having to know more about the theory
than the names it uses. Such phenomena are more aptly called “praxis-laden”
than “theory-laden,” for the theory has become embodied and hides itself in a
public praxis. Such embodied theories “dress” the phenomenon and such
“dressing” can become the basis for a description of the phenomenon. The
experimental phenomenon is not formally theory-laden, but praxis-laden and
the product of an interpretative art.45
Scientific theory and scientific phenomena are related within the context of
a hermeneutic of sign (data) and object (phenomenon). The hermeneutic is
local, historical, contextual, and realizable only within a standard
institutionalized praxis.
3. Perceptual Realism: The thesis of the primacy of perception entails that
theory is justified by being used to naturalize new scientific phenomena in the
perceptual world. 46 Theory then is not just a technique for manipulating the
environment, it is itself world-building in that it furnishes our world with new
things.47
4. Hermeneutical or Horizonal Realism: Turning to the current debates in
epistemology and the philosophy of science, a form of Scientific Realism is
defended here which I call “Hermeneutical Realism” or, to emphasize the
primacy of perception, “Horizonal Realism,” or Scientific (Phenomena)
Realism whenever I want to stress its opposition to the Scientific (Theory)
Realism of current controversies.48 This is opposed to the Instrumentalism of
many phenomenologists and critical theorists.
5. History of science: The history of science is more than the history of
scientific writings and discourse, including illustrations, mathematical models,
or abstract theories; in addition, there is the history of the culture of laboratory
instruments with special reference to readable technologies; for not through
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books, language, and pictures alone do explanatory scientific entities get their
social and historical constitution as realities, but through the readable
technologies by which they are “dressed” so as to become a naturalized part of
the furniture of this world, laden with the ambiguity of a historical perception.
6. Complementarity and Modern Physics: Natural and naturalized objects of
perception can equally be characterized by complementarity understood as the
way some human embodiments--even non-technological ones--preclude the
exercise of others, with the consequence that some kinds of phenomena can
appear as “dressed” only in certain ways49; e.g. the geometry of a space-time
object is determined by the embodiment and interests we bring to it.50
7. The human knowledge community: The community of human knowers is
then comprised of irreducible complementary subcommunities, linked by
linguistic and nonlinguistic channels of intercommunication, and bound
together--to the extent that bonds exist--by bonds of mutual trust, good will,
and common goals, which mutually exclude, however, simultaneous access to
common experiential horizons.51
8. Scientific explanation:
Where then does this leave the account of
explanation in the natural sciences?
(1) In the first place, one has to
distinguish carefully between (1a) the nomological or computational aspects of
explanation which deal with correlations among phenomena, and (1b) the
constitutional aspect of explanation which deals with the origins of
phenomena. In the vocabulary of Ricoeur, Apel, and other continental
philosophers, the former alone is called “explanation” and it is taken to be the
characteristic of the natural sciences. The latter is called “understanding” and
this is taken to be characteristic of the human sciences.52 It is clear that a more
comprehensive account of the notion of explanation in the natural sciences
employs both of these activities.
In addition, one would have to distinguish (2) between semantic and
perceptual contexts--they are different, (3) between the perceptual contexts of
natural world horizons (unaided by technologies) and those of naturalized
world horizons in which readable technologies are used--when the last word is
spoken, they are continuous and indistinguishable, and (4) among the
respective communities of inquirers involved in the different phases of the
inquiry, each in relation to perception with its different mode of embodiment
and different hermeneutical interests--these are complementary. If the concept
of explanation were to be so enlarged, it would be necessary to go beyond the
semantics of mere truth-functional discourse to the practical dimension of
discourse, and consequently to distinguish (5) between truth-functional
sentential logic and a quantum logic of the existential contexts of discourse.53
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Where does this leave the account of explanation in the natural sciences? It
shows that if explanation is limited to (1a), i.e., to the causal, nomological, and
deductive relationships among phenomena and their descriptions, then the
phenomena in question cannot be natural pre-scientific phenomena as Logical
Positivism and much of Logical Empiricism assumes, but naturalized scientific
phenomena constituted by institutionalized processes of preparation and
measurement. However, if the notion of explanation is enlarged (as it should)
to include (1b), i.e., how scientific phenomena are constituted in local media,
then explanation is no longer just computational or derivational, but it is
historical, social, artistic, and hermeneutical. 54
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NOTES
*This paper was originally written for the Research Conference on Continental and
Anglo-American Philosophy: A New Relationship, organized by Stephen Toulmin and
Paul Ricoeur at the University of Chicago (1984). I thank Stephen Toulmin, Hugh
Silverman, Joseph Kockelmans and Lajla Lund for their comments on the paper; these
have helped greatly in the revision of the original text.

1

. See the references for a listing of some of the more important works in this
tradition. For an overview of contemporary German work on the philosophy of
science, see Bubner (1981), pp. 69-154.
2

. Cf the works of J. Ellul, M. Foucault, Marcuse, and others.

3

. A view going back before psychoanalysis to Nietzsche and picked up later
by many, such as G. Bachelard, M. Heidegger, H. Marcuse, and others.
4

. (Aristotelian) Theoria is a disinterested form of general knowledge often
taken as the ideal of science; it is not, however, constituted by human life but it
is (according to the classical authors) a sharing of the exemplary ideas of the
Demiurge. Heidegger (1962) sees modern science as the heir to classical
metaphysics, the metaphysics (as he says) of the merely “present-at-hand.”
Also see Gadamer’s comments in (1975), p. 413, and Kockelmans (1985) and
(1986).
5

. Cf. Suppe (1974) for an excellent overview of the analytic tradition of the
philosophy of science.
6

. Such are the background assumptions, say, of Apel, Gadamer, Bernstein,
Habermas, and Heidegger.
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7

. Sellars (1963).
. Cf. Habermas, J. (1971); Apel (1980), who misreads Peirce in this respect;
Gadamer (1981) and (1975), pp. 409-411. See Kockelmans (1985), chapter V,
for an excellent review of Heidegger’s thought on the mathesis of the natural
sciences.
9
. Apel (1980), p. 49.
10
. Husserl (1970c), p. 252; see also Heelan (1987).
11
. Merleau-Ponty (1962), p. viii.
12
. Merleau-Ponty (1962), p. ix, my free translation.
13
. See, for example, Gadamer (1975), pp. 409-411, and the works referenced
below; see also Pavlovic (1981), and Simpson (1983).
14
. Husserl (1970a); also prefigured in Husserl (1952).
15
. Cf Zucker (1982).
16
. Heelan (1987).
17
. Cf. Reid (1970).
18
. See Husserl (1970a), p. 55, and Zucker (1982).
19
. Husserl (1970b).
20
. Quotation marks usually signify that there is something problematical about
the usual meaning of the term and includes a promise to deal with the problem
below--or later.
21
. Despite its different vocabulary, the thrust of this latter movement has
much in common with a variety of contemporary Anglo-American movements
(or counter-movements) that have all tended to undermine the traditional belief
in the objectivity of science, and to give support instead to the view that
science is a function of human life, social values, and historical-culturaltechnological environment. See, for example, Toulmin (1960, 1972); also the
historical work of T.S. Kuhn, G. Holton, L. Fleck,and L. Laudan; the
sociological studies of such as B. Barnes, D. Bloor, B. Latour, M. Mulkay, S.
Shapin, and S. Woolgar (see Knorr-Cetina, 1981); and the critique of logical
empiricism by J. Compton, P. Feyerabend, M. Grene, N. R. Hanson, M. Hesse,
M. Polanyi, R. Rorty, S. Toulmin, G. von Wright, and M. Wartofsky (see
Suppe, 1974 for summary).
22
. Heidegger (1962). For a study of the implications of Heidegger’s early
views for a philosophy of natural science, see Seigfried (1980), Kisiel (1977),
and Kockelmans (1985).
23
. Merleau-Ponty (1964b, 1968); Ricoeur (1981). See also, for example, the
referenced works of Compton, Dreyfus, Ihde, Kisiel, and Zucker, to mention a
few, who share this project.
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24

. Among writers currently working in the genre of a phenomenological
philosophy of natural science are, to mention just a few, John J. Compton,
Robert Crease, Hubert Dreyfus, Marjorie Grene, Gary Gutting, David
Hemmendinger, Don Ihde, Theodore Kisiel, Joseph Kockelmans, Wolfe Mays,
Joseph Rouse, Hans Seigfried, Elizabeth Ströker, and Francis Zucker. Not all
of these would agree with the positions here enuntiated, but I believe all would
appreciate their relevance to the basic problematic of a phenomenological
philosophy of science. Among those who notably fail to exploit aggressively
the positive implications of the insight that the standpoint of science cannot be
objective and universal is, for example, Gadamer, cf Gadamer (1975), pp. 409411; also Pavlovic (1981), and Simpson (1983).
25
. Merleau-Ponty (1964b), p. 178.
26
. See Gadamer (1975), pp. 397-431.
27
. See Heelan (1983a) and (1988).
28
. See Husserl (1952, 1970a). A perceptual essence is for Husserl the
invariant (noematic) law among the set of profiles (perspectives) through
which a perceptual object reveals itself to a perceiver who explores it actively
(noetically) with his or her body. See also Heelan (1987) for an interpretation
of these as related to the representations of active and passive transformation
groups. For the notions of essence and specific essence, see Husserl (1952).
29
. See Wigner (1967) for a physicist’s account of the importance of
transformation groups in physics.
30
. The constituting role of scientific technologies has generally been
overlooked wherever science has been accepted, as it has been bymost writers
in the phenomenological tradition, as a culmination of the classical tradition.
See Kockelmans (1985), sect. 22 for the critique of technology that follows
from this position. Heidegger (1977) begins with a critique of modern science
and modern technology and eventually ends with something like the kind of
resolution which lies at the basis of this paper.
31
. See Heelan (1987).
32
. Duhem (1954) and Hesse (1980) on the underdetermination of theory by
data.
33
. I make a terminological distinction between “datum” and “phenomenon”; a
datum is to a phenomenon as a profile is to a perceptual object; thus, data, e.g.,
a set of measured values of O, provide the profiles of the phenomenon O that is
being measured.
34
. The nature of this mediation is suggested by the view of the early
Heidegger that all human knowledge is existentially hermeneutical.See
Heidegger (1962) in which existential hermeneutics is introduced.
Methodological hermeneutics is the traditional discipline which concerns itself
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with the meaning of signs. Once the signs are successfully interpreted,
however, they become transparent and do not occupy a place in the objective
perceptual field. It is in fact characteristic of a successful hermeneutic that the
signs disappear from the objective field; it may sometimes be the case that the
signs were never presented or understood as a system antecedent to being used
interpretatively. Once a sign system is used successfully, it may be difficult to
recover anew or perhaps uncover for the first time the objective system of signs
that is being used; the difficulty of linguistic studies suggests this. Existential
hermeneutics is the name for the ontological character of human
understanding. I have proposed to give an account of this as structured by a
relationship between objects meant and the underlying codes to which they are
related. See Bleicher (1980) for a general overview, and Ricoeur (1981); also,
for the last point, Heelan (1983b).
35
. See Heelan (1983c) and (1988).
36
. The Heideggerian notion of theory, as found, say, in Heidegger (1977) and
the later works, is well articulated in Kockelmans (1985) and (1986).
37
. Heidegger (1962), p. 98.
38
. See Heidegger (1962), pp. 188-195; also Gadamer (1975), Dreyfus (1980).
39
. For Gadamer’s view on the role of language in the making of a human
world, see Gadamer (1975), pp. 397-447.
40
. Heelan (1983a), chapters 10 and 13.
41
. Cf Heidegger (1962), pp. 188-195.
42
. See Heelan (1983a), chap. 15. The “dressing” analogy is not to be pushed
too far; there is no “naked” entity, just as there is no “naked” perceptual
essence. A particular “dressing” is a particular set of perceptual profiles
constituting a particular perceptual essence for the scientific entity.
43
. Merleau-Ponty (1964b), p. 178.
44
. Cf. Peirce on “Thirdness”; that something--a sign--is taken to stand for
something--an object t-- by an interpretant -- the act of interpretation by a
community of interpreters. See Peirce (1931-1958), vol. 1, 1.300-1.353,
especially 1.338; also 2.228-2.308; for the interpretative character of
perception and science, see 5.182-5.184.
45
. See, for example, the discussion in Suppe (1974), pp. 125-190, and Heelan
(1983a) and (1988b).
46
. Many, such as Hanson and Churchland, make an analogous claim that
science transforms the way we perceive the world. The argument they present
is based solely on the kinematical aspects of the prescientific and scientific
theories, and so the choice between the frames they offer to describe the sun is
no more than a matter of convention, not revolutionary and with nothing to do
with complementarity. However, there is a truly scientific difference between

22

Hermeneutical Phenomenology and the Philosophy of Science

sun-centred and earth-centred theories because these are related to different
laws of dynamics. To find a valid argument, one would chose to compare
Aristotle (and the old dynamics) with Newton (and the new dynamics), instead
of Kepler and Tycho Brahe for in the latter case the evidence was merely
kinematical. See Hanson (1961), pp. 6f; and Churchland (1979), pp. 30-35, for
their treatment of this question.
47
. Heelan (1983a), chap. 11; this is also a position held by Peirce, see Peirce
(1931-1958), 5.189-5.212.
48
. See Heelan (1983b), (1983c), and (1983a), chapter 8.
49
. Cf. Merleau-Ponty (1968), e.g., pp. 90-91, 94-95. It is interesting and
significant that the term “complementarity” used by Merleau-Ponty and Apel is
used with the conscious suggestion that such a sense could resolve the more
than fifty year old enigma of what is called “complementarity” in quantum
mechanics. This suggestion I believe is correct, and I have shown elsewhere
how the peculiar logic of quantum mechanics, quantum logic, can be
understood as the general logic of contextual embodied discourse within
language. See Heelan (1983a), chapters 10, 11, and 13.
50
. Heelan (1983a), Part I.
51
. Cf Gadamer (1975), pp. 397-447, and Ricoeur (1981).
52
. See Ricoeur (1981), pp. 145-164.
53
. Note how this analysis contrasts with the the common assumption of
continental philosophers such as Apel, Habermas, the early Merleau-Ponty,
and by analytic philosophers such as Sellars, Rorty, Churchland, that problems
in the philosophy of science center on the replacement of the semantics of
natural perception (say, of heat-as-felt) by the semantics of scientific theory
(say, of thermodynamics) rather than on the complementarity of such
frameworks stemming from the embodied and hermeneutical character of acts
of perceiving.
54
. See Heelan (1983a), chap. 10.
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